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Monopoly in the Marketplace of Ideas

Economics and Freedom of Expression: Media Structure and the First
Amendment. By Bruce M. Owen. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975. Pp. xxi, 202. $15.00.

Reviewed by Richard A. Posnert
Bruce Owen, an economist at Stanford University, has written a
useful but somewhat disappointing book' on an interesting subject:
the effect of the structure and regulation of the communications media
on diversity of expression. Stripped of its introduction and conclusion, two appendices, a long bibliography, and a "very cursory"
chapter on magazines and motion pictures, 3 the book is seen to consist of two essays, one on newspapers and the other on radio and
television.
The newspaper essay (Chapter Two) is largely descriptive. The history of newspaper publication in this country is reviewed, yielding
the unsurprising conclusion that the number of daily newspapers has
declined sharply over time due to technological change and the competition of other media. 4 Owen shows, persuasively I think, that cost
and demand conditions severely limit the possibilities of competition
within local newspaper markets.; The chapter is interesting and wellwritten.
The radio-television essay (Chapter Three) is devoted largely to a
description of the history and present pattern of regulation of electronic media by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
The well-known perversities of that regulation are discussed, with
appropriate indignation.6 Both Chapters Two and Three also describe, briefly and on the whole noncommittally, antitrust policy
7
toward the communications industries.
t Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1.

B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: MEDIA STRUCrURE AND THE FIRST

AMENDMIENT (1975) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. P. 169.
3. Pp. 169-81.
4. Pp. 48-52.
5. Pp. 50-52.
6. E.g., pp. 102-16.
7. Pp. 52-55, 122, 139-40.
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Save for some previously unpublished data on newspaper costs
(compiled by Owen's colleague at Stanford, James Rosse),8 I found
no original research in the book. Nor, I am bound to say, is the book
rich in original thinking. Chapter Two is, as I have said, mainly
descriptive, and Chapter Three echoes the criticisms of governmental
regulation of the broadcast media made either by Ronald Coase in
his pathbreaking 1959 article on the FCC 9 or by others later.10 The
major points are:
(1) The Supreme Court has countenanced much greater governmental regulation of the electronic media than of the print media
on the ground that radio and television use the electromagnetic spectrum, a "limited" resource. In fact, the print media utilize equally
scarce resources'"-otherwise there would be more newspapers than
there are. Furthermore, the scarcity of spectrum space is largely an
2
artifact of governmental regulation.1
(2) In any event, spectrum scarcity has been overcome by the development of cable television, with its practically unlimited channel
capacity. The realization of cable television's potential has been
thwarted, however, by governmental regulation-in particular by
the FCC's limitations on pay television, which deny viewing minorities greater access to television than that provided by the existing
broadcast system and thereby limit diversity of expression.' 3
Lack of originality need not condemn a book; a book that summarized the scattered economic literature on the communications
media would serve a useful purpose. Owen's book does this, but it
is too diffuse, polemical, and structurally unbalanced to fill the bill
completely. The introductory chapter confesses the author's inability
to deal "with the issues in this chapter in a 'linear' fashion."' 4 The
newspaper chapter is too detailed, the radio-television chapter too
sketchy, and the book as a whole too freighted with tables, appendices,
8. P. 85.
9. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
10. See, e.g., Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television
Industry, 3 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. SCI. 98 (1972); Johnson, The Future of Cable Television: Some Problems of Federal Regulation (RAND Corp. Jan. 1970).
11. Pp. 106-07; R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 313 (1972).
12. Pp. 106-07; R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 313; Coase, supra note 9, at 20-21, 27-28.
13. Pp. 114-16, 136-37; Posner, supra note 10, at 102-06; Posner, The Probable Effects
of Pay Cable Television on Culture and the Arts, in THE: ELECTRONIC BOX OFFICE: HUMIANITIES AND ARTS ON THE CABLE 79, 89-90 (R. Adler & W. Baer eds. 1974). The appendix
to Chapter Three, written by Owen in collaboration with Michael Spence, constitutes a
more rigorous analysis of the likely effects of pay television than previously attempted.
Its main conclusions, however, accord with those of the informal analysis of the earlier
literature. Compare pp. 164-65 with Posner, supra note 10, at 102-06.
14. P. 1.
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and other distractions to satisfy the reader seeking an introduction
and summary.
I am bothered by the author's breathless style and by the number
of unexplained and unsupported assertions in the book. The following are some examples:
And surely the most powerful and subtle vehicles for attitude
change and persuasion, as well as reinforcement, are dramatic
and literary works. 1
On the other side, it is probably a lot harder today to reach everyone in a local community with a message than it was 100 or 150
years ago, or at least there are fewer ways of doing it.:6
The notion that television is uniquely powerful and influential,
and hence requires government regulation for "McLuhanesque"
reasons, is almost certainly the result of the unnatural degree of
economic concentration and
advertiser dominance that flows from
7
present regulatory policy.'
We do not want a fair and balanced press-we want a system of
expression which is robust and *partisan and impassioned.' 8
A more serious shortcoming of the book is that, as the last passage
I quoted may suggest, Owen lacks a clear conception of what it is he
wants from the media. It is possible to appraise the performance of
the communications media from the standpoint of economics by
using the criterion of efficiency. But, like many ecofiomists, Owen
apparently prefers to approach the problem from a different, less
confining standpoint. His touchstone is not efficiency but the First
Amendment-and not its letter ("Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press") but its spirit, which
in Owen's view implies "a positive obligation to intervene in various
carefully defined ways when freedom of expression is threatened by
private agglomerations of power."' 19 "Freedom of expression," however, is nowhere adequately defined.2 0 It is in Owen's hands a slogan
used to carry his argument over difficult points.
In his fervor for freedom, Owen assumes the mantle of the "libertarian." 2' 1 That is a fair description of his attitude toward current
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

P. 11.
P. 52.
P. 120.
P. 188.
P. 2.
Owen's most explicit attempt at definition is: "Freedom of expression must ...

mean something like equal freedom of all speakers .... I believe this notion of freedom

is approximated by an economically competitive market for ideas." P. 4.
21. P. 2.
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governmental regulation of the media. Yet he seems also to favor,
more tentatively in the body than in the conclusion of the work, 22
such highly intrusive forms of media regulation as making newspaper
printing plants common carriers, 23 breaking up the networks or limiting the amount of programming they may originate, 24 and stripping
cable television operators of all program control. 25 Whether the total
impact of Owen's various proposals can fairly be described as "libertarian" may be doubted.
My sharpest disagreement with Owen concerns precisely the basis
of his proposals, tentative as they may be, for subjecting the media
to novel forms of governmental control. Owen conceives of media
firms as "gatekeepers" that control the flow of news and opinion and
screen out ideas inimical to their economic interests or otherwise uncongenial to them. 26 Given this gatekeeper function, Owen argues,
concentration in the media industries entails a reduction-, potentially
to dangerously low levels, in the diversity of views disseminated to
2
the public. 7
This argument, however, seems to be based on a confusion of the
effects of monopoly on price and on product variety. No doubt a
media monopolist could charge a higher price than a competitive
firm, but it does not follow that he would offer a product mix different from or inferior to that which a competitive industry would
offer. Owen relegates this important question to a confusing, coauthored appendix to Chapter Three, which compares competitive and
monopolistic equilibria under two broadcasting systems-pay television and advertiser-supported television. Owen contends that under
either system a broadcast monopolist would probably supply fewer
programs than competitive firms, 28 but he acknowledges that, where
programs are highly substitutable and channels are limited, the
monopolist might supply a more diverse set of programs.29 It would
22.

Compare, e.g., p. 58 with p. 185.

23. Pp. 58-59.
24. Pp. 122, 185.
25. Pp. 136, 185.
26. Pp. 12-13.
27. Pp. 26-28, 186-87.
28. Pp. 152, 157.
29. According to Owen, at p. 159:
With very close substitutes, the tendency of monopoly to restrict programs becomes an advantage....
Monopoly has another potential advantage. If the number of channels is limited,
competitive advertiser support may use up scarce channels with close substitutes.
Monopoly may limit the number of close substitutes, and use the remaining channels
for programs that are less [perfect] substitutes. Such programs may be less profitable
individually but do not cut into the audiences generated by the other programs
as much.
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seem, therefore, that Owen, who is concerned more with the variety
than with the volume of programming, would be inclined to temper
his opposition to a monopolistic organization of the media, at least
if channels continue to be limited by the FCC. But he does not. 30
It appears that Owen's principal objection to monopoly is not that
a profit-maximizing monopolist might produce a different (and from
a First Amendment standpoint inferior) product mix, but that a
media monopolist might not actually maximize profits; rather, he
might fail or refuse to disseminate ideas and opinions for which there
is a public demand. 3 1 However, the monopolist who thus indulged
his personal tastes with respect to the news content or editorial policies of his newspaper or television station would incur a financial
cost in reduced demand for his product.
Owen rejects this point by arguing that the penalty to the monopolist for indulging his personal tastes in expression is less than it would
be for a competitive firm: the monopolist reduces his profits; the
competitive firm jeopardizes its survival. The situation is more complex. The monopolist who fails to maximize his profits becomes an
attractive target for a takeover bid by an individual or firm committed to profit maximization.3 2 And it is false that a competitive
firm which incurs an unnecessary cost or reduces the value of its
product is thereby doomed; that depends both on the shape of the
firm's marginal cost curve and on the ownership of any specialized
resources used in the production of the firm's output.33 More im30. Owen states that "there is a school of thought" suggesting "that from the First
Amendment standpoint, monopoly is not necessarily a factor leading to a decline in
diversity of sources of opinion. We must reject this." P. 4.
31. Id.
32. Owen asserts that the takeover threat to non-profit-maximizing media monopolists
is slight because in the newspaper industry "family ownership is still very common"
and in the broadcasting industry "all controlling stock purchases must receive FCC
approval." P. 5. Whether family ownership hinders or facilitates takeovers is an empirical question on which Owen provides no evidence. Family firms are mainly small, and
small firms are probably easier to take over than large ones. Thus, it is not intuitive
that newspaper publishers are, on balance, harder to take over than other firms. As for
broadcasting takeovers, Owen cites no evidence, and I know of none, that the requisite
FCC approval has proven to be a significant obstacle to controlling stock purchases.
33. If a firm can reduce its marginal cost by reducing its output (i.e., if it faces
an upward-sloping marginal-cost curve), then it can adjust to a fall in price (due to a
fall in the quality of its product) or a rise in its costs by reducing its output. So long
as this reduction leaves it producing at a point where price equals or exceeds average
cost, the firm can remain in business even in a perfectly competitive market.
A firm using specialized resources that cannot or will not be shifted elsewhere by
their owners can reduce output and still produce at a point on an upward-sloping marginal cost curve above average cost. If, on the one hand, the resource owners do not
own the firm, they presumably would prefer to relocate the resources if the firm fails
to maximize the value of the resources and hence the rents to the owners. But whether
the owners can do this depends on whether their contracts with the firm permit them
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portantly, quite apart from these technical flaws, Owen provides
neither evidence nor reason to support his apparent belief that media
entrepreneurs commonly sacrifice profits to their desire to influence
public opinion.
Furthermore, Owen's premise that monopoly power is widespread
in the communications industries may be doubted. Newspapers face
vigorous competition from television and other sources. All signs
point to vigorous competition among the television networks, at least
in programming. Indeed, economic theory suggests that oligopolistic
industries are apt to compete more vigorously in nonprice dimensions
of service than unconcentra-ted' industries, in effect substituting nonprice for price competition,34 And the casual evidence-all we haveis that the private economic interests of the media owners do not
shape their editorial stance or 'news selection: the policies of the
New York Times, Washington Post, CBS, and other "powerful" media
outlets appear to be completely independent of and largely antithetical to the private economic interests of the wealthy individuals who
own (or manage the business side of) these enterprises. Owen ignores
these points.'
What I have said hardly constitutes a rigorous demonstration that
media concentration poses no threat to diversity of expression. Elsewhere I have indicated some areas of concern. 35 But Owen's argument
against concentration, far from being rigorous, is, as he presents it,
barren of theoretical or empirical support. Owen embraces it as an
article of faith.
to do so and on whether the resources would really be more valuable in the hands of
other managers. If, on the other hand, the resources are owned by the same people
who own the firm, then the firm can subordinate profit maximization to the pursuit
of other goals to the extent of the rents that the specialized resources generate.
34. For one version of the argument, see R. POSNER, ANTiTRusr LAW: AN EcoNoel1C
PERSpECnVE 11-12 (1976).
35. Posner, supra note 10, at 106-10.

572

